Pro-rata System of Promotion: Is it Mandalisation of the Army

Recently there have been two articles on the issue of pro-rata system of promotions in the Army. First by Ajai Shukla in his article ‘Soldier Heal Thyself’ in Business Standard and second by another armoured corps officer http://goodnewz.in/Blog2/?p=101

Let us look at the points they make and see as to where would they eventually lead. Their opposition to pro-rata promotion policy of the Army can be summed up as, `professional militaries have employed the criterion of merit alone to select their senior command. For over half a century, so did the Indian Army; but recently, in a burst of patrimonial fervour, quotas were instituted to ensure that each combat arm got its share of the senior ranks. Initiated by artillery and infantry chiefs to safeguard the interests of their officers, the quotas are now favouring less talented officers of other arms’.

Pro-rata system of promotions has hurt the armoured corps officers the most because earlier system allowed them far better chances of promotion to the ranks of Brigadier and above then officers of the Infantry and Artillery. Consequently they oppose it on grounds of merit. They rest their argument that the Armoured Corps officers are more `Meritorious’ on three claims. First, that initial intake in the armoured corps has always been better. Second, the Armoured Corps groomed it’s officers better. Third, the armoured corps officers operate on a larger canvass. Hence aremore knowledgeable and more competent.

In this paper we shall look at these arguments dispassionately and logically.

Point No. 1: Better Officers were commissioned in the Armoured Corps. The armoured corps officers make a justified claim that in earlier times, and to a large extent even today, only three types are commissioned into the armoured corps. First are the cadets from `super block', that is those who are graded first 10 or 20 in the merit list drawn at IMA. Irrespective of the fact that such a merit list is entirely based on the subjective assessment of young officers, for the time being let us say that it was entirely fair. Second are those with `parental claim', apparently they have no intrinsic claim to `merit' except accident of `birth'. Third belong to the category of influential families who could pull strings.

Apparently second and third category can not be called meritorious by any stretch of imagination. However coalescing of these three categories would create a closely-knit group where back-scratching would be the norm. Discipline of such a group will not be based purely on hierarchy but ability of the concerned officer to influence the chain of command with his links and cross-links between majority of officers. Two obvious conclusions emerge. First, the members of such a group will take care of each-other and inflated assessment would be the norm. Second, certain amount of laxity and dilution of discipline would be accepted in the name of regimental traditions, which is sought to be justified as `grooming’.

Such a system is total anti-thesis of Meritocracy and Moltke, the creator of professional officer corps of Germany would be turning in his grave for being misquoted by supporters of the theory that armoured corps= merit.

Point No. 2: Advisor is better than Owner. Better professional exposure due to the role of armour in operations. Normally, a squadron of armour supports the operations of an infantry brigade, and a regiment that of a division. The ‘area of influence’ and ‘area of interest’ of an armour commander is therefore vast as compared to his counterpart in Infantry…Such exposures give them a degree of self assurance, insight and opportunities for learning that are not available to their counterparts in the Infantry. For instance, when the squadron commander attends his CO’s orders, he gets a fair insight into the way the GOC intends to fight the divisional battle...` The argument is carried further to make a preposterous claim that advisor is better than owner, `a squadron commander is therefore an inherent part of the planning process at the Brigade HQs, and his CO is an advisor to the GOC'.

Advisor is the one, who gives advice or an opinion or; counsel. He advises on the matters of his specialization. In army Infantry commanders have benefit of advice from specialists from a junior level onwards. For example a Combat Patrol Leader of Infantry (Combat Patrols are invariably led by Infantry Officers) may have an Engineer or any other specialists as advisor depending on the task. Similar situation prevails at Rifle Company level. The Company Commander will invariably have an artillery officer as advisor and others may be included based on task. A Commanding Officer of infantry battalion would definitely have an Artillery Battery Commander and a Medical Officer as advisors. He may have more depending on task. An Infantry Brigade Commander has many advisors, like officer commanding engineer company, signals company, workshop company and artillery unit commander. Squadron Commander from Armoured Corps may also be there if brigade has tasks in plains or deserts. Armoured Corps has negligible employment in mountains or riverine terrain. These advisors exist to provide special to corps technical advise to the infantry commander who is not expected to be all that conversant with technical details of specialist corps. Such advisors exist at Division, Corps and Command level too. These advisors have no command authority over the battalion or brigade and their specialized elements are in support of the Infantry.

The point to ponder is why these worthies are termed `advisors’ and not commander Answer is simple and straight. Infantry is the basic arm of any army, including the most modern ones. While employment of all other arms and services including armoured corps is limited to certain types of tasks, terrain and climatic conditions, no such restrictions apply to Infantry. By virtue of its ability to perform all types of tasks in all types of terrain, in all weather conditions and at all times Infantry is equated with the Queen on a chess board. Hence the basic premise that command of all combat formations such as Infantry Brigade, Infantry Division and Corps ought to vest with Infantry Officers.

Secondly, if for the sake of argument we were to accept the argument advanced by the armoured corps officers that because their squadron and unit commanders are advisors to certain infantry brigades or divisions, they are better placed to understand operations at higher level then same argument ought to apply to engineer, signals EME and ASC officers and should apply with greater force to officers of Intelligence Corps and Judge Advocate Branch because they are advisors at even higher level. It should also apply to IAS and IFS officers who are advisors to the Minister of Defense (RM). After all the RM is senior to COAS and hence his advisors have greater `area of influence’ and hence fitter to take over command of army Corps and Theater Commands.

Fact of the matter is professional competence of military profession cannot be defined with such casualness. In reality these worthies are advisors with regard to their own specialisation and have NO (NO) capability or mandate to define the deployment of battalions or brigades. On the other hand the company commanders by virtue of being basic building block have a larger say in deployment and role in subsequent shaping the battle.

Point No. 3. Size of Area of Influence. A divisional battle will never be decided by actions or otherwise of unit of supporting arm. It will be decided by the actions of the Arm possessing Core Competency. In case of an Infantry Formation it will be Infantry and in case of mechanized formation it will be armoured corps and mechanized infantry.

Hence the conclusions are obvious. Infantry Formations ought to be commanded by Infantry Officers and Mechanised Fromations by officers from mechanized fraternity.

Limits of Theoretical Knowledge. The fact is that an army officer is required to operate at a particular level while in a certain service bracket. Just because one of them has wider general knowledge about affairs at another level does not make him better always. That is why entrance examination for DSSC is pitched at Battalion level, irrespective of the knowledge some officer may have about operational plans of a corps. Third part is about specialization of each arm. The very edifice of the Army is built of many `corps' who exist due to their specialization, that is, Armoured Corps has specialization in mechanised warfare. Infantry by its very nature is more flexible and more usable and hence more prevalent. Hence the infantry are not only more suited but more deserving for heading combined arms organisations.

However to be fair to all and in respect to their specialization the concept of pro-rata has been instituted, which is fair and square from every angle.