Inaction is the Best Policy

As an Indian I have no love lost for the Pakistan Army who have been implacable foes for us but again as an Indian I have greatest interest in getting the Taliban defeated. Hence when someone who has been the COAS of Indian Army analyses ongoing operations (Rah-e-Rast) in Swat I sit up and take intense interest in his writings.

But I am sorry to say that Gen Malik in article ` Pak offensive against Taliban’ The Tribune 03 June 2009, fails to enthuse me. Because his analysis smacks of defeatism. It criticises for the sake of it and fails to offer any worthwhile alternative course of action. Every point he makes is totally pessimistic.

First he pontificates that while `it will be easy for the army to enter cities, towns and villages...civil administration will take time to establish’. This is nothing but stating the obvious because the fact applies to all wars. So what is the general suggesting? No operations!

Second, the general claims that if army operations succeed it may act catalyst for consolidation of Talibs for neighbouring regions and in case of stalemate it may encourage Talibs to claim victory’. A strange kind of argument. The good general seems to be suggesting that `if you try you are sure to fail' thus `inaction is best'. How in keeping with his quick acceptance of governmental caveat that LoC not be crossed!!

Third, He claims that Pakistan army has no experience of counter-insurgency because it was focussing on conventional war with conventional tactics against India. So the deduction to me is that it must use the tactics it is good at. But when it is using conventional tactics Gen Malik criticises it for the fear of alienating local populace (as if they are any better now). Pray what is the answer? None so far as Gen Malik is concerned. Inaction perhaps!

Fourth, some of the points he makes about the tactics also seem to be quite premature or subjective. He criticises the policy of retaining certain control over media reporting from combat zone. But we all remember that US Policy of having embedded journalists (whose reports were vetted before airing) paid good dividends during Gulf War and on the other hand unrestricted reporting on Kargil did raise some controversies!

He again states the obvious that defeating Pakistani Taliban is intimately linked to success of operations in Afghanistan. This is true and as one gathers from press reports there seems to be certain synergy between NATO operations in Afghanistan and Pak operations in Swat.

Notwithstanding this, the broader question is what should a country do when faced with extra-territorial linkages to terrorism. Answer was provided by the Indian Army (in post Malik era) by fencing the LoC and thereby isolating and defeating terrorists in Kashmir.

Role of any Army is to fight and win, winning hearts and minds is for other organs of the state as conclusively proven by Sri Lank. Any attempt to divide soldier's attention by engaging him into non-military tasks should be seen for what it is - ploy by a weak military leadership hell bent on securing political patronage. How much harm such leadership has caused to Indian Army is a subject for historians.